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Abstract: This paper develops a choice model for environmental public goods which allows for 
consumers to learn about their preferences through consumption experiences. We develop a theoretical 
model of Bayesian updating, perform comparative statics over the model, and show how the theoretical 
model can be consistently incorporated into a reduced form econometric model. Our main findings are 
that in a Random Utility Model (RUM) discrete choice model, a subject’s scale should increase and the 
variability of scale should decrease with experience if subjects are Bayesians. We then estimate the 
model using field data regarding preferences for one particular public good, water quality. We find 
strong evidence that additional experience increases scale, thereby makes consumer preferences more 
predictable from the econometrician’s perspective.  We find supportive but less convincing evidence 
that experience decreases the variability of scale across subjects.    
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Consumers often make decisions under uncertainty about their preferences, such as when a firm 
introduces a new product. Experience goods are goods for which consumers are uncertain about their 
preferences and learn about them with each consumption event (Nelson, 1970; 1974; Stigler et al., 
1977). Economists often model experience goods by assuming consumers have a true preference 
parameter, or type, which they learn about through Bayesian updating. For private goods, preference 
uncertainty for an experience good is revealed in agents’ purchasing decisions over time. However, for 
public goods or quasi-public goods, rich panel data to test and control for the relationship between 
experience and preference uncertainty or learning often do not exist because markets for public and 
quasi-public goods are often incomplete  (Carson et al., 2014). 
In the environmental economics literature, experience with a public good has been shown to matter 
both for measures of  the predictability of consumers’ preferences and as a determinant of willingness 
to pay (WTP) for public goods (Boyle et al., 1993; Adamowicz, 1994; Whitehead et al., 1995; Cameron et 
al., 1997; Breffle et al., 2000; Ferrini et al., 2007; Hanley et al., 2009).1  However, there is no broadly 
accepted way to test for and control for the effects and presence of experience and learning on WTP.2 
This is particularly important for non-market valuation methods such as contingent valuation and 
discrete choice experiments (DCE) both because the public good being valued may be unfamiliar to 
many respondents, and because respondents are presented with information describing the public good 
at the beginning of the study (Bateman et al., 2004; Carson et al., 2011).   
This paper develops a theoretically consistent and readily implementable method of explicitly 
controlling for the effect of experience on preference and willingness to pay estimates for public goods.3  
Motivated by previous work in the literature, we use a simple Bayesian theoretical model to identify 
how additional experience would affects a consumer’s preference uncertainty for an experience good 
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from a Bayesian perspective (Ackerberg, 2003).  We then link the theoretical model to a reduced form 
generalized mixed logit model (G-MNL) widely used in discrete choice experiments to estimate demand 
for public good and quasi-public goods.  The extended G-MNL model both tests and controls for the 
effects of previous experience with the public good in estimating willingness to pay.  It allows 
preferences to become more deterministic both within and across subjects from the perspective of the 
analyst as experience with the good increases.4 We then estimate the reduced form econometric model 
using a data set well-suited to test for the effects of experience on preference uncertainty.   
The Bayesian theoretical model leads to two testable hypotheses when applied to the reduced form 
econometric model.  First, in the Bayesian exercise, a consumer becomes less uncertain about their own 
preferences for a public good (e.g., their type) as they have more consumption experiences (e.g., more 
signals).  Our econometric model controls for the effect of experience on preference uncertainty by 
allowing the model’s scale parameter to be a function of experience.  The scale parameter weights the 
importance of the deterministic portion of a random utility model (RUM) relative to the idiosyncratic 
portion. An increase in the scale parameter increases the relative importance of the deterministic 
portion of the utility function.  Put another way, utility over a good, a public good becomes more 
deterministic from the econometrician’s perspective as the scale parameter increases.    Second, in the 
Bayesian exercise we also find that increases in experience also decrease the variance of the scale 
parameter across individuals.  Any heterogeneity allowed in the idiosyncratic portion of a RUM is 
predicted to be reduced by the Bayesian model. 
With respect to the first hypothesis, we find that experience, consistent with the theoretical exercise, 
significantly increases the scale parameter.  This result is strong and robust.  We find mixed evidence for 
the second hypothesis: experience does decrease the variance of the scale parameter but that result is 
only marginally significant.  Significance of the result was sensitive to whether 1) we allowed for 
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preference heterogeneity in the public good’s price and 2) the functional form of the distribution of 
scale parameters.   This is possibly due to lack or power in our data, as we discuss below, and merits 
additional research.   
There are several reasons why this paper is an important contribution. First, our model offers a 
theoretically consistent and parsimonious empirical technique for taking experience into account for 
researchers using random utility-based valuation approaches. While other researchers have accounted 
for experience in stated preference demand estimation, we are not aware of any commonly used 
approach which is theoretically motivated.  Second, while there is strong evidence for one of the 
hypotheses derived from the Bayesian model, the evidence for the second hypothesis is less robust.  As 
a result, this paper shows a need to both better understand how experience affects preferences for 
public goods and develop a theoretically consistent model which captures these effects. Given that 
previous research shows prior experience is correlated with preferences and WTP, understanding this 
link is vital for forming efficient economic policy.5 Lastly, the empirical model proposed is widely 
implementable for both private and public good settings, and for both revealed and stated preference 
data. While there are other simulation based structural models that can allow control for experience 
explicitly (Crawford et al., 2005; Osborne, 2011), the model here is easily applicable to a widely used 
method for estimating demand for public and quasi-public goods.  As a result, we present a 
parsimonious way of controlling for the effect of experience on preference uncertainty insofar as 
consumers are Bayesian updaters.  It can be applied as a simple extension of the standard econometric 
approach to choice experiment data, and which is an intuitively plausible and attractive way of thinking 
about how people’s preferences are influenced by consumption experience. 
 
2. Theoretical Motivation 
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Using a simple Bayesian framework, this section shows the expected effects of experience on the 
observed choices of consumers when additional consumption events help to refine preferences for a 
good. We demonstrate how this framework can be carried over to the case of public goods within the 
standard random utility model of demand (McFadden, 1974; Hanemann, 1984). This section shows that 
previous experience will increase the scale and decrease the scale variance heterogeneity for individual 
consumers.  
In line with the random utility model in the experience good literature (Ackerberg, 2003), assume the 
utility derived from a good is: 
 𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝜷𝒋
′𝑿𝒋 + 𝛿𝑖𝑗
𝑡+1 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡   
where i  indexes an individual, j  a good, and t  time.  This specification takes a Lancasterian view of 
utility in that individual traits of a good affect a consumer’s preference for it (Lancaster, 1966).  The 
traits or attributes of good j are given by the vector jX  and marginal utility over those traits of good j  
are jβ ; for exposition here, they are not assumed to be individual-specific as with a random coefficients 
model but could be represented in that way with no loss.6 Utility for the good is also a function of an 
idiosyncratic component, 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡, which varies with each consumption experience.  This term reflects the 
varying levels of utility a consumer enjoys from a good.  For example, it could reflect utility received 
from visiting a beach depending on the weather on a particular day.  Importantly, this idiosyncratic 
component of utility is observed by the consumer before they decide to actually consume the good.  The 
idiosyncratic utility component is assumed normal and is drawn from the same distribution for all agents 
in the economy: 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜖
2).  
There is also a component of the utility function,  1tij , which we follow Ackerberg (2003) in calling 
“experience utility”.  It is a scalar representing how much utility a consumer receives due to factors 
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unobservable to them at the time of consumption (e.g., their type).  This term could represent intrinsic 
feelings about a good (e.g., walking along a particular beach) conditional on observable characteristics.  
Importantly, consumers do not observe  1tij  before they consume the good; hence the t+1 timing of 
this component of utility whereas all other goods have the t subscript.  In the simplest case,  1tij  would 
be time invariant in which case consumers learn their type with certainty after one consumption 
experience.   More generally, we model “experience utility” as the sum of a time invariant mean and 
random idiosyncratic component:   1tij ij ijtu .  The time invariant component of experience utility 
we call a consumer’s type: ij .  We assume that the idiosyncratic component is normally distributed 
around zero:  2~ (0, )ijt uu N .  Lastly, we assume that there is a known distribution of time invariant mean 
types across the population: 𝛿𝑖𝑗~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝛿
2). 
Following Ackerberg (2003), the consumers’ problem can be thought of as learning about the “true” 
type from a sequence of noisy signals.7  We model the learning process as a Bayesian updating 
procedure.  Individuals never receive a signal that perfectly reveals their type in this model. Instead, 
individuals observe the sum of their time-invariant type and idiosyncratic random utility component 
(e.g.,   1tij ij ijtu ). As a result, individuals must infer what their time invariant type is, ij , by 
evaluating the likelihood they had the experience they did given their priors over type and the 
distribution of the idiosyncratic error term, ijtu .
8 
Following DeGroot (1970) and Ackerberg (2003), we assume priors over a consumer’s type, ij , are 
distributed normally, 𝛿𝑖𝑗
𝑜 ~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑜
2).  After K  consumption experiences with the good, posterior beliefs 
about type can be represented as: 























By inspection, additional experience has an ambiguous effect on the mean of beliefs over type; the 
relative strength of an individual’s experience must be compared to the reduction in mean from 
additional experiences. The variance of beliefs over type is falling in experience (e.g., the second term 
falls as K  increases).  
Now consider how this model of learning would manifest itself in the dynamics of consumption 
decisions. For exposition, assume an individual’s true type is half of one standard deviation below the 
mean type:   .5ij , and that the variance of both the prior and true type is one. In this example, we 
plot the posterior distribution given an expected draw (e.g., the posterior conditional on draws of the 
individual i ’s true type:     1 .5tij ij ijtu ) in Figure 1. Put another way, we parameterize this 
example so that there is no noise introduced by the idiosyncratic term. Therefore, Figure 1 shows the 
updating of the posterior distribution of beliefs over type,  1Kij , for one and two draws respectively. 
There are two important features of Figure 1. The first is that, as expected, the consumer’s posterior 
mean type,    
1K
ijE , falls given new consumption experiences because each signal is below the mean 
of their prior. Second, the variance around the posterior mean is decreasing as successive signals 
mechanically decrease the variance of posterior beliefs. In this simple example, we assume that both 
consumption signals are the mean true signal for expositional purposes, but this assumption can be 
relaxed without qualitative loss.9 
Figure 1 and equation 2 above show that a model of Bayesian learning dictates that additional 
consumption experiences with a good will decrease the variance of a consumer’s utility for that good. 
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Put another way, the variance of the composite idiosyncratic term, 𝛿𝑖𝑗
𝑡+1 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡, decreases as experience 
levels with a good increase. Effectively, the magnitude of the composite idiosyncratic component of 
utility decreases relative to the deterministic component as experience with the good increases and a 
consumer’s uncertainty over her type is reduced. Therefore, relative to the magnitude of the 
deterministic component of utility (e.g., j jβ X ), the model predicts the variance of the idiosyncratic 
portion of an agent’s utility should be falling in the amount of experience with the good as an individual 
has more experience with a good.  
The above Bayesian model has implications not only for the magnitude of the deterministic component 
of utility relative to the idiosyncratic component of utility within a respondent but also for the variance 
of that magnitude between respondents. The variance of the full idiosyncratic portion of utility (to the 
econometrician) conditional on K  consumption events is: 








+ 𝜎𝑢2 + 𝜎𝜖2.  
By inspection, the variance of the uncertain portion of utility is also decreasing with experience.10  
Across all agents, then, the model predicts that the variance of the idiosyncratic portion of utility should 
be decreasing in experience.  This would be true even if different agents had 1) biased versus unbiased 
priors or 2) the strength of priors was allows to vary across the population (e.g.,  2u  varies by individual).  
Put another way, any type of heterogeneity in the variance of the idiosyncratic portion of utility would 
be ameliorated with additional experience.   
In sum, allowing for Bayesian learning through experience creates variation in the magnitude of the 
deterministic component of utility relative to the stochastic component of utility. The magnitude of the 
deterministic component of utility relative to the stochastic component of utility is often referred to as 
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the ‘scale’ parameter in empirical work. The theoretical model above shows that scale should increase 
as experience increases (e.g., the relative magnitude of the deterministic component of utility 
increases). Further, scale heterogeneity should decrease in experience as experience reduces the 
variance of the composite error term. From a theoretical perspective, not allowing the scale and scale 
variance to vary with experience amounts to misspecification of the error structure. 
 
2.1 Application to the Random Utility Model Framework. 
 Consider the implications of Bayesian updating model for a multiple-good or multiple-attribute discrete 
choice model in a random utility framework (McFadden, 1974). The key aspect of the model presented 
to the econometrician is that both the consumer’s idiosyncratic component of utility, 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡, and the 
experience component of utility,  1tij , are unobserved.  Intuitively, then, from the econometrician’s 
perspective the random component of utility is the sum 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛿𝑖𝑗
𝑡+1 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡.  As shown above, if the 
variance of the experience component of utility ( 1tij ) decreases with experience, so must the variance 
of  ijt .  This subsection presents how this artifact of the theoretical exercise above can be applied to a 
random utility model to consistently control for the effects of experience in a choice experiment.   
Since the econometrician does not separately identify the experience and idiosyncratic portions of 
utility, for the remainder of the paper we combine these two components into their sum.  Specifically, 
for the remainder of the paper the random component of utility refers to the random component of 
utility from the econometrician’s perspective.  As shown above, then,  ijt  refers to the sum of the 
experience and idiosyncratic component of utility since they are both unobserved from the 
econometrician’s perspective.11 
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The utility associated with any choice experiment alternative can be divided into a sum of contributions 
that can be observed by a researcher, and a component that cannot, and hence is assumed random. 
Specifically consider the following empirical specification of a random parameters multinomial choice 
model: 
(3)       it ijt i i ijt ijtU Alternative j U β x  ,  
where:  
 ijtU  represents respondent i ’s utility associated with selecting alternative j  out of a set of J  
available alternatives at time occasion t ; 
 the stochastic component of the utility function    may be interpreted as resulting from 
researcher’s inability to observe all attributes of choice and all significant characteristics of 
respondents (McFadden, 1976), or as decision maker’s choice from a set of his decision rules 
(Manski, 1977). 
 ijtx  is a vector of respondent- and alternative-specific choice attributes, i.e. goods or their 
characteristics; 
 iβ  represents a vector of individual-specific taste parameters associated with marginal utilities 
of the choice attributes. The multivariate distribution of these parameters in the sample is f , 
𝛃𝒋~𝒇(𝐛, 𝚺), where b  is a vector of sample means and Σ  is a variance-covariance matrix, with a 
vector of square roots of diagonal elements s  which represent standard deviations of random 
taste parameters; 
  i  is the scale parameter which normalizes the variance of   to 1.
12 The scale parameter can be 
individual-specific, as it is reasonable to allow different agents to have relatively larger or 
smaller idiosyncratic components as opposed to deterministic components of the utility 
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function.13 The scale heterogeneity of the agents can be described with a parameter  , such 
that given the scale distribution g, 𝜎𝑗~𝑔(1, 𝜏).
14 
The above specification of the random utility model accounts for unobserved preference heterogeneity 
in terms of both taste parameters and scale. In addition, one can introduce observed preference 
heterogeneity in the model by including individual-specific covariates of means of random taste 
parameters b , their variances , the scale parameter   or its variance  . A convenient reduced form 
way of accounting for previous experience is by estimating the term   explicitly as a function of prior 
experience, z , so that 𝜎𝑗~𝑔(1 + 𝚽′𝒛, 𝜏). Allowing the vector z to be comprised of experience related 
covariates, then, operationalizes the theoretical model presented above. Specifically, the theoretical 
model predicts that experience related covariates should increase the mean of the scale parameter, 
thereby decreasing the magnitude of the error term in equation (4).   
There are three important features of this characterization of the econometric model. First, there is no 
distinct modeling of the experience component of utility.  The goal of this paper is to consistently model 
the effects of experience on utility in a reduced form econometric model.  Actually identifying the 
parameters of experience utility, then, we leave to future work.  Second, an agent might never receive a 
sufficient number of signals to discover their “true” type.  For example, one sufficiently bad draw could 
lead to a consumer to form posteriors well below their mean experience utility – the first oyster I eat is 
bad and therefore I never eat another oyster even though on average I am an oyster lover. Third, we 
treat z  as a count variable in the econometric model of Section 3 therefore neglecting the variability in 
signal strength across occasions.  Put another way, using a count variable such as number of 
consumption experiences neglects possibly heterogeneity in the intensity of each experience.15 
Allowing experience related covariates to affect the mean of the scale parameter is equivalent to 
allowing experience to influence all the taste parameters.16 Provided that all utility function taste 
Experience and Preferences for Public Goods 
12 
 
parameters are random and they are allowed to be correlated, this effect may already be to some 
extent accounted for by off-diagonal elements of Σ  (Hess et al., 2012). Collecting the common effect for 
all taste parameters has, however, a very interesting behavioral interpretation – allowing scale to be a 
function of previous experience permits the magnitude of the error term, to be systematically related to 
experience. As a result, the relative importance of observable characteristics in determining utility is 
exactly what is implied by Figure 1 above: as experience increases, agents learn their type with more 
certainty so that choices become less random.17 
Finally, just as experience-related covariates in the mean scale collect common effects for all taste 
parameters, introducing experience-related covariates in the variance of the scale parameter collects 
common effects for variances of all random parameters. In this case, the scale variance can be modeled 
as a function of experience, 𝜎𝑗~𝑔(1, 𝜏exp (𝛏′𝒛𝒋)). Behaviorally, this effect allows experience to cause 
respondents to become more similar/different with respect to how deterministic their choices are.18 
This paper proposes a way in which experience can be accounted for in econometric modeling of 
consumers’ preferences in a random utility framework as introduced above. In particular, by focusing on 
effects of experience on scale and scale variance, we implement a reduced form way for Bayesian 
updating to inform the econometric specification. In the remainder of the paper we demonstrate how 
this can influence preferences and public good willingness to pay estimates.19 The method developed in 
this paper is widely applicable to both stated and revealed preference data.20 
There are a range of other lenses through which the effects of experience and learning on stated WTP 
have been investigated. The first relates to the literature on option values and the idea of commitment 
costs. Corrigan et al. (2008) use the framework of Zhao et al. (2004) to model the effects of being 
allowed to postpone a “purchase” decision over an environmental good in order to gain more 
information about it. WTP thus depends on expected gains in information in their framework. A second 
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lens literature shows that experience can help people learn their preferences for unfamiliar goods 
within choice experiment settings, and that the context of this learning is very important (Plott, 1996; 
Bateman et al., 2008; Brown et al., 2008; Norwood et al., 2011). This works studies what helps 
preferences for unfamiliar goods or unfamiliar valuation mechanisms converge into stable values over 
repeated interactions which are consistent with the axioms of economic theory in what Brown et al. 
(2008) call “preference refinement”.   For example, convergence which exist for private goods through 
repeated transactions are almost never available for environmental public goods (Plott, 1996).  
Finally, there are many papers which consider how people learn as they complete increasing numbers of 
choice tasks and the implications of this specifically for the scale parameter (see Czajkowski et al., 2014 
for a recent review). In stated preferences, initial work by DeShazo et al. (2002) shows that the scale 
parameter changes with a number of measures of choice set complexity. Hu et al. (2006) found the scale 
parameter decreases as respondents progress through choice sets and thus gain more experience in 
choosing.  Finally, Lusk et al. (2008) finds that providing more information on choice options for 
consumer purchases has a significant effect on the scale parameter.  Our paper is different from all of 
this previous work in that our goal is to develop an econometric framework to control for prior 
experience with a good (as opposed to an elicitation mechanism) in a theoretically consistent way, 
which as shown above has very specific implications for the scale parameter. 
 
2.2 Econometric treatment 
In this section we set out a method for accounting for the effects of experience on consumers’ 
preferences in discrete choice models by allowing for experience-related observable and unobservable 
preference and scale heterogeneity in a manner consistent with the theoretical treatment of the 
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preceding section. We later apply these methods using two case study data sets to investigate how 
experience and familiarity with the good influences respondents’ preferences and scale.  
The random utility framework presented in the previous section conveniently lends itself to econometric 
modeling – random utility theory is transformed into different econometric models by making 
assumptions about the distribution of the random error term and the random parameters. Typically,  ij  
is assumed to be independently and identically (iid) Extreme Value Type 1 distributed across individuals 
and alternatives; in addition, assuming that all the random taste parameters are multivariate normally 
distributed21 and that the individual scale parameter is log-normally distributed22 leads to the 
Generalized Multinomial Random Parameters Logit model type II (G-MNL; Fiebig et al., 2010). Following 
the notation introduced in section II, respondent i ’s utility associated with choosing alternative j  is: 
(4)      ijt i i ijt ijtU b υ x  ,  
where the individual-specific random taste parameters are now represented by a vector of their 
population means b  and individual-specific deviations from these means iυ . The new subscript t  
represents different choice tasks the same respondent may face – in discrete choice experiments an 
individual is confronted with a sequence of choice tasks which allows the researcher to extract more 
information from each respondent of the study, and facilitates identification of preference and scale 
heterogeneity (Ruud, 1996; Revelt et al., 1998; Fosgerau, 2006; Hess et al., 2011). 
The key focus of our theoretical treatment is on the representation of the effects of experience in a 
random utility model. Therefore, we adapt the G-MNL model to account for the effects of experience, as 
explained in section II. This can be done by introducing indicators of experience or familiarity with the 
good  z  as covariates or means and variances of random taste parameters 
𝛃𝒋~MVN(𝐛 + 𝚽′𝒛𝒋, 𝚺exp (𝛙′𝒛𝒋)) and/or as covariates of random scale and its variance 𝜎𝑗~LN(1 +
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𝚽′𝒛𝒋, 𝜏 + 𝛏′𝒛𝒋).
23 Importantly, allowing for scale heterogeneity provides a convenient way in which the 
behavior of the error term can be a function of previous experience which Section II shows must be 
allowed for in order for the empirical model to be consistent when allowing for Bayesian learning. 
Further, while the theoretical model predicts scale should increase in experience and scale variance 
should decrease with experience, thereby decreasing the magnitude of the error term relative to the 
deterministic portion of the utility, we do not restrict parameters estimates thereby permitting any 
relationship between experience and the parameters of interest. Finally, we do not have exogenous 
variation in experience.  People who prefer the good more than others typically are observed as having 
a higher measured level of experience.  Rather, our model tests and controls for learning through 
experience.24 We cannot, therefore, make causal inference about the effect of experience on 
preferences. 
The above model specification results in the following probability of observing respondent i  choosing 
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Since the probability is conditional on the random terms, the unconditional probability is obtained by 
multiple integration, the expression for which does not exist in closed form. Instead, it can be simulated 
by averaging over D  draws from the assumed distributions (Revelt et al., 1998). As a result, the 
simulated log-likelihood function becomes: 
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In the Results section of this paper we estimate the above empirical model fora stated preference 
choice experiment. Because of the importance of information processing in motivating our approach, 
we are particularly interested in the coefficients on z , which will be proxies for prior experience with 
the good being studied, and which enter the utility function as covariates of the scale parameter and its 
variance, thus allowing for Bayesian updating.  
 
3. Description of Data  
In this paper, we use a choice experiment data set to explore the effects of respondent experience with 
an environmental good, beach water quality, ideally suited to use the theoretical and econometric 
framework introduced above. Beach water quality is ideally suited for this exercise because the dataset 
contains a measure of previous experience with beach water quality (number of beach visits) allowing us 
to use our technique with a viable experience proxy.  This section describes that data set.  
This study considered the economic value of potential improvements to coastal water quality such as 
may result from implementation of changes to the European Union’s Bathing Waters Directive in 2015 
to people living in Northern Ireland. The focus of this Choice Experiment was on the valuation of 
changes in coastal water quality to those who use beaches in Northern Ireland for recreation. This group 
of respondents is likely to be particularly affected by changes planned under revisions to the Bathing 
Waters Directive, since many of the water quality parameters which this directive focuses on are those 
linked to human health and the exposure of beach users to illness from contact with water-borne 
pathogens. The current revisions to the Directive relate to greater restrictions upon the standards for 
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bathing water.  The attributes chosen for the DCE describe three relevant aspects of coastal water 
quality: benthic health, human health risks, and beach debris. For each aspect, respondents were able to 
select between no change to the existing policy, a small change and a large change.  Supplementary 
online appendix B describes the three aspects in more detail.    The per visit cost to an individual of 
visiting a beach with a given set characteristics (the costs of travel to the site) was used as the cost 
attribute. Travel costs have been used before as the price attribute in several choice experiments 
relating environmental quality changes to recreational behavior (e.g., Hanley et al., 2002; Christie et al., 
2007). Six levels of additional cost were selected: 0, £0.6, £1.6, £3, £6, and £9. 
The design of the experiment was generated using efficient design principles. With three blocks, this 
meant that each individual responded to 8 choice cards. In each choice card, respondents were asked to 
choose the option they preferred from three choices. A sample choice card in included as Figure 2. Some 
558 respondents were surveyed on-site at a range of beaches around the Northern Irish coast in autumn 
2011.  
In this study, the indicator of respondents’ experience with the good “coastal water quality” which we 
used was the reported number of days spent at the beach each year  bdays . We are confident that 
number of days spent at the beach per year is a good proxy for experience here as beach quality is 
visually observable. It is also in the interest of beach goers to find out about water quality measures for 
health reasons before they enter the sea to go swimming or surfing, and such information is displayed 
on-site at designated beaches as part of a requirement of the Bathing Waters Directive.  
The premise for using this dataset is that beach water quality is an experience good.  Put another way, in 
order for the dataset to be valid in estimating our model, agents don’t know their true “type”, on 
average, for water quality until they have had experiences with it.  The following chain of events must 
occur in order for the dataset to be valid in a study which appropriately controls for experience on WTP 
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for public goods: 1) agents make a recreational choice conditional on their priors over their type, 2) 
while agents are engaged in recreational choice they experience the recreation environment, 3) one 
component of that environment is related to the relevant program (e.g., water quality along the beach), 
4) agents update their preferences for said component of the environment (e.g., water quality).  
Importantly, the policy alternatives explicitly have the characteristic of affecting the “component of the 
environment” (e.g., water quality).  This chain of events assures that we have measured valid experience 
proxies as well.  In sum, then, since the policies relate environmental components for which agents have 
experienced via their recreational choices, they are able to update their preferences for those goods. 
It should be noted that our measure of familiarity, number of visits to the beach, is not exogenous. It is 
likely to be correlated with preferences for amenities associated with each public good. Indeed, finding 
an instrument for experience or familiarity can always be an issue in empirical work on experience 
goods. As a result this study cannot identify a causal link between experience and scale nor scale 
variance.25 We can, however, still construct and estimate a model which is theoretically consistent with 
Bayesian updating of preferences and test whether the theoretical predictions of the model are 
consistent with the data.  
 
4. Results 
We estimated the augmented G-MNL model described in section 2.2 which allows us to account for the 
effects of experience on respondents’ choices assuming that all taste parameters are random, normally 
distributed, and possibly correlated. The indicators of respondents’ experience or familiarity with the 
good were included as covariates of scale and its variance.  This section reports our results.  We also 
briefly discuss important features of the policy covariates before discussing coefficient estimates for our 
experience proxies and their implications. 
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The estimation was performed using Matlab 8.1 Optimization Toolbox, using 1000 shuffled Halton draws 
to simulate distributions of random parameters. We found the log-likelihood function of the G-MNL 
model to be relatively flat near the optimum – we therefore used multiple starting points and relatively 
tight convergence criteria to ensure convergence at the global maximum.26 
 Standard errors of coefficients associated with standard deviations of random parameters were 
simulated using Krinsky and Robb method with 106 draws (Krinsky et al., 1986). We use the following 
dummy coded choice attributes: SQ  – an alternative specific constant associated with the no change 
(no improvements) alternative; improvements in benthic health ( 1BH  – small increase, 2BH  – large 
increase) with no improvement as a reference level; reductions of health risks ( 1HR  – reduction to 5% 
risk, 2HR  – reduction to ‘very little risk’) with the current 10% risk as a reference level; and 
improvements in debris management ( 1DM  – prevention, 2DM  – collection and prevention). In 
addition, the linearly coded variable FEE  represented the additional cost of travelling to each beach. 
The resulting vector of choice-specific variables was: 
  1 2 1 2 1 2, , , , , , ,SQ BH BH HR HR DM DM FEEX  .  
We used bday  – log of the reported number of days spent at the beach each year (mean 74.89) as a 
proxy of respondents’ experience or familiarity with coastal water quality.27 
We estimate the model allowing the cost parameter to be random and non-random.  Allowing a random 
cost parameter significantly outperforms the non-random cost parameter model by both the log 
likelihood criterion and the AIC, we provide the latter for comparison because it is a common practice in 
applied work aimed at calculating mean WTP (and not only its median).  Table 1 presents our choice 
model estimates.  The important distinction in it, though, is the comparison between allowing 
experience measures to enter the scale and scale variance measure (e.g., comparing column 1 to 2 and 
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column 3 to 4) within each cost parameter specification.  In each case, we assume the scale term is 
distributed log normally.   
The taste parameters of the coastal water quality study are very well-behaved, all highly significant and 
of expected sign. There is a considerable amount of unobserved preference (taste) heterogeneity. The 
results indicate that respondents perceived improvements in debris management as the most 
important, followed by reductions in health risks and improvements in benthic health.  
The number of days a respondent spent at the beach in the past year ( bday ) was added as a covariate 
for scale and scale variance in columns 2 and 4.  Looking at the random cost results, respondents who 
visited beaches more often had a significantly higher scale parameter (i.e. lower magnitude of the error 
component in their random utility function) at the 1% level and significantly lower scale variance at the 
10% level. This is consistent with the model of Bayesian updating developed in Section 2. Column four 
shows that when we restrict the cost parameter to be non-random, the effect of experience on mean 
scale is still positive and significant at the 10% level.  The effect of experience on scale variance is still 
negative but is no longer significant at the 10%.   
Figure 3 plots mean scale and scale variance as a function of function of our experience proxy.  The 
experience proxy is demeaned and normalized so that 0 corresponds to mean experience, and -1 and +1 
to 1 standard deviation worth of deviations from the mean.  Figure 3 shows that scale increases and 
scale variance decreases with experience. However, the estimates in the right-hand panel associated 
with the non-random cost parameter are much less precise.  The rigidity of the non-random cost 
parameter trades off against the scale term since the scale term dictates the ability of the RUM to link 
each consumer to their stated preferences.  In effect, then, allowing the cost parameter to be random 
permits the experience measure to have more explanatory power over the idiosyncratic error term.  
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Taken together, Table 1 and Figure 3 provide support for the predictions of the theoretical model as 
applied to the econometric model presented in section 2.  Evidence for the first prediction of the 
Bayesian model (experience increases mean scale) is more robust than for the second prediction 
(experience decreases scale variance).   
Lastly, we perform a joint hypothesis test.  We test whether as experience increases that both scale 
increases and scale heterogeneity decreases since the theoretical Bayesian model implies both occur the 
simultaneously.  To do so, we perform a likelihood ratio test of the preferred model with random cost 
parameters in columns 1 and 2 and the models with non-random cost parameters in columns 3 and 4.  
In the model with random cost (e.g., columns (1) versus (2)) the p-value for the joint test that increases 
in experience both increase scale and decrease scale heterogeneity is .0004.  In the model with random 
costs, then, adding experience related covariates significantly improves the model fit.  The p-value in the 
model with non-random costs (e.g., columns (3) versus (4)) is .299.  As a result, we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis that adding experience related covariates significantly improves model fit with non-random 
costs.  As before, it appears that the rigidity of the non-random cost parameter trades off against the 
scale term since the scale term dictates the ability of the RUM to link each consumer to their stated 
preferences.  For a public good for which agents have less preference heterogeneity, then, we would 
expect to reject the joint null hypothesis even in the model with non-random cost parameters.  In sum, 
with the preferred random costs model we find evidence that agents update their preferences in a way 
consistent with Bayesian updating.   
While we do not report results here, we also estimated the model while specifying a Weibull distribution 
for the scale parameter.  The Weilbull distribution is advantageous in its shape flexibility, however, the 
variance of a Weibull distribution is a function of its scale and shape parameters, neither of which in and 
of itself fully determines the variance.  In those regressions, evidence for the first prediction remained 
robust.  For the second prediction, though, the estimated scale variance was not significant or even took 
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to wrong sign.  We therefore believe our results to provide strong evidence in our case study that the 
scale parameter increases with experience, however, evidence that scale variance across subjects 
decreases with experience is somewhat tenuous.  Within a subject, then, scale increases with 
experience as predicted by the Bayesian model. However, across subjects, it appears that the 
implications of the Bayesian model are less well supported by this data.28 
Although the main contribution of this paper is to investigate the effects of experience on preferences 
for an environmental public good in a theoretically consistent model, we also investigate the importance 
of controlling for experience on willingness to pay point estimates and confidence intervals.  We 
calculated implicit prices associated with each attribute. Since the price coefficient in our studies was 
assumed random in the best fitting models, the ratio distribution resulting from dividing each random, 
normally distributed parameter associated with the attribute levels with the random, normally 
distributed cost coefficient does not have finite moments, i.e. no mean and standard deviation of the 
empirical (Cauchy-like) distribution of WTP exist (Hinkley, 1969). For this reason, we calculated median 
WTP, along with its simulated standard error, and the 0.025 and 0.975 quantiles as proxies of the 95% 
confidence interval. In order to do so we adopted the following simulation method, based on the Krinsky 
and Robb parametric bootstrapping technique: 
(1) we took 105 multivariate normal draws from the estimated vector of model coefficients and the 
associated variance-covariance matrix; 
(2) for each of the draws we assembled the variance-covariance matrix from the simulated 
elements of the lower triangular of Cholesky matrix and took 105 multivariate normal draws 
using the simulated random taste parameters and their variance-covariance matrix; 
(3) we calculated ratios of respective preference parameters to calculate WTP for each of the 
attribute levels. The empirical distributions of WTP allowed as to observe the median and the 
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0.025 and 0.975 quantiles (95% quantile range of WTP distribution) along with their simulated 
standard errors. 
Table 2 compares the three different policy interventions for the water quality study. The median WTP 
estimates are very stable when experience is or is not included as a covariate for scale and scale 
variance. Both the magnitudes across econometric models and the WTP estimates within models are 
similar. Further, adding experience-related covariates to the water quality study does not significantly 
decrease the variance of median WTP estimates. It is important to stress, though, that these WTP 
estimates are for only one particular public good and there are several caveats to apply here.  First, 
beach visits is only a proxy for peoples’ experience with beach quality.  It is possible that better 
measures exist.  Second, the degree that consumers’ priors are biased or unbiased for a good would 
affect how important including experience with a public good is.  Third, since the second prediction of 
the Bayesian model is not as robust as the first, the particular theoretical model proposed here could 
need refinement. Indeed, these are fruitful areas for future research.  
 
5. Conclusions 
It is surprising that the full implications of experience on preferences have not received more attention 
in the literature on the estimation of demand for public goods for which market data does not exist. We 
offer a theoretical model which shows that within a Bayesian framework, not permitting scale and scale 
variance to vary with experience amounts to a mis-specification of the structure of the error term in 
random utility models. We then develop and estimate a reduced form econometric model of demand 
estimation which both extends the generalized multinomial logit model and is consistent with this 
Bayesian theoretical framework. 
Experience and Preferences for Public Goods 
24 
 
The Bayesian theoretical predictions for the effects of more experience on the idiosyncratic component 
of utility are generally supported by data in our case study (coastal water quality).  The results for the 
first theoretical prediction, that individuals with more experience have a higher estimated scale 
parameter, is strong and robust.  The results for the second theoretical prediction, that heterogeneity in 
scale across respondents should decrease with experience, is present but less convincing motivating 
future work in this area.  We show in supplementary online appendix A that the G-MNL model is also 
implementable with other theoretical approaches to learning. 
There are several implications of the results in this paper. The first is whether consumers do update as 
Bayesians or use some other updating procedure. This paper shows that we cannot reject a Bayesian 
model of updating. However, this does not imply that the Bayesian model is the correct one since our 
results are not causal. Indeed, more work on the second theoretical prediction of the Bayesian model is 
needed.  To that end, other models posited by the literature on the effects of experience on economic 
actions include behavioral models such as confirmatory bias and rational inattention (Rabin et al., 1999; 
Gabaix et al., 2006). Second, while we offer on theoretically consistent econometric model that controls 
for experience level, there are potentially other models yet to be implemented. Third, we can make no 
claims as to the causal effect of experience and learning on WTP.  The causal effect of learning on WTP 
for public goods and policy options which change the supply of such goods is a question which requires 
further empirical work. Finally, we note that our model does not allow for the precise sequencing of 
experiences to matter for preferences or for scale, only their quantity.  Further, we do not have any 
measure of the intensity of experiences in our data, only its frequency. It may also be that individuals 
sort heterogeneous experiences into a finite number of “categories”, and that this process in itself helps 
determine the way in which experiences influence future choices (Fryer et al., 2008). All of these would 
be interesting sophistications to explore. 




 In addition, e.g., Brown et. al. (2008) and Kingsley et al. (2010) ask how agents value public goods as they have 
more experience in valuing them (rather than direct experience with the good being valued).  For example, these 
papers have subjects repeatedly choose between binary states of the world within a given survey to see how 
preferences change and/or become more stable for a particular good within a given survey.  These studies, then, 
ask important questions about the refinement of preferences which could come from thinking about a good, 
thinking about comparisons between management options for the good, or becoming more familiar with the 
survey or valuation technique within one particular survey.   As a result, their preference uncertainty is quite 
different than our investigated here.  More broadly, there is a larger body of work which addresses how familiarity 
with markets or valuation mechanisms can affect stated or revealed willingness to pay measures (List et al. 1998 
and List 2001). In contrast our paper is about how previous experience with a particular public good affects WTP 
for it when elicited in a standard choice experiment.  Combining these two approaches, we feel, is a fruitful area 
for future work. 
2
 We do not address the much more complicated issue of the causal effect of learning on WTP.  This paper merely 
seeks to control for extant effects of experience and learning in a theoretically consistent way.  
3
 There is significant interest in empirically identifying how learning about private goods affects preference 
uncertainty and consumer demand (Erdem et al., 1996; Ackerberg, 2003; Crawford et al., 2005; Goeree, 2008; 
Osborne, 2011). In this literature, a formal model of learning and information agglomeration is often integrated 
into the demand framework in a theoretically consistent way and estimation occurs in an explicitly Bayesian 
structural model (Ackerberg, 2003; Israel, 2005).  In contrast, our model is a reduced form model with a 
specification that is informed by theory. 
4
 Insofar as our model decomposes the error in a choice experiment setting, this work builds on Scarpa et al. 
(2005). 
5
 Whilst for the particular data sets and measures of experience used in this paper our “new approach” does not 
result in big differences in welfare measures, we think its merit lies in presenting a way to model the effects of 
experience in a manner which is theoretically consistent.   




 We relax this assumption below.  Supplementary online appendix A considers the implications of more general 
utility specifications. 
7
 Note that learning could affect both means and variances of random taste parameters, and as a result, the mean 
and variance of willingness to pay. This will be discussed in more detail below.  Additionally, there is also a 
literature in marketing research which models the effects of past choices, expectations and learning-through-
inspection on choices and preferences in the current period, which is very much in the spirit of the kind of Bayesian 
updating we employ here: see Meyer (1982), Meyer et al. (1997) and Meyer (2008). 
8
 For example, when a new good is introduced, say a new restaurant, a consumer will not likely be able to 
distinguish between the possibility they like that restaurant more than the average patron (e.g., their ij ) or if 
they happened to have a particularly good experience on that occasion (e.g., ijtu ). 
9
 One could perform Monte Carlo simulations over the entire distribution not conditioning on realized signals. 
There would be no qualitative differences, though, as it would have the effect of increasing the size of the tails in 
each posterior distribution. 
10
 Note that this result would hold even if the population error variance term were allowed to be heterogeneous 
across the population so long as it remains iid. 
11
 In order to separately identify these two parameters, either a structural model or a panel dataset is needed.  
Given our focus on widely implementable WTP estimates for public and quasi-public goods (for which panel 
datasets are rare) we leave separately identifying these effects to future work. 
12
 Note, that the scale cannot be econometrically separated from the other parameters of the utility function and 
the estimates of taste parameters are in fact multiplications of the underlying taste parameters and scale (Fiebig et 
al., 2010). With no loss of generality one can normalize scale to 1 and, due of the ordinal nature of various utility 
functions, treat the estimates of utility function taste parameters as true taste parameters, which can only be 
interpreted in relation to each other.  
13
 For example, when one agent has very well-defined preferences, one would expect their deterministic 
component of utility to be large in magnitude relative to the idiosyncratic component. 
14
 In this case the mean of the scale parameter is normalized to 1. 




 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing both of these things out to us. 
16
 Thus, as Louviere and Meyer (2008) put it: “The estimated parameters of choice models reflect not just the 
enduring preferences that consumers may have for products and attributes, but also the momentary state of 
consumer learning about products.” (page 22). 
17
 Another way to interpret this is that the errors in the random utility model are heteroskedastic in previous 
experience.  
18
 Another alternative, adding experience as an explanatory variable for parameter uncertainty (e.g., in the 
covariance matrix of a parameter in a random coefficient model), has no clear theoretical foundation either. The 
goal of this modelling approach is to build a widely implementable model that accounts for experience in a 
theoretically motivated way without having the endogeneity concerns of prior work (e.g., Carson et al., 2009). This 
model is flexible enough to control for learning through experience without being subject to the same endogeneity 
concern as using experience directly as a linear argument in the random utility function.  Another alternative is 
allowing experience to directly affect preference parameters using a large structural model (Goeree, 2008; 
Osborne, 2011).  While theoretically consistent, these labor intensive models are not easily implementable by 
researchers in a public and quasi-public good setting.  
19
 There are other ways in which experience has been introduced in demand estimation studies and we briefly 
review them in ssupplementary online appendix A. This model, though, can be integrated with those alternative 
techniques as well – the technique we develop here is similar to those discussed in ssupplementary online 
appendix A if consumers, on average, have unbiased priors.  
20
 Insofar as this model allows for scale heterogeneity across individuals, it builds on Train et al. (2005) and Scarpa 
et al. (2008), which could also potentially allow for adding similar experience related controls. 
21
 𝛃𝑗~𝑀𝑉𝑁(𝐛, 𝚺), so i i β b ΓΩς , where ΓΩ  is a lower triangular matrix resulting from Cholesky decomposition 
of the variance-covariance matrix Σ  of random taste parameters  Σ ΓΩ ΓΩ  with the vector of square roots of 
diagonal elements s ), such that Γ  has ones on the diagonal and possibly non-zero below diagonal elements 
accounting for correlations of random taste parameters, Ω  is a diagonal matrix of standard deviations s , and iς  
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is a vector of random, normally distributed unobserved taste variations associated with taste parameters (with 
mean vector 0 and covariance (identity) matrix I ). 
22 𝜎𝑗~𝐿𝑁(1, 𝜏), so  0expi i     where 𝜀0𝑖~𝑁(0,1) and 
2 2   . 
23
 Since experience-related covariates enter diagonal elements of Σ  only (i.e. only the variances of random taste 
parameters),    exp idiag Ω s ψ z . 
24
 Put another way, if agents do update their preferences with additional consumption experiences then a G-MNL 
model which does not control for learning in a theoretically motivated way is misspecified.    
25
 To do so, the econometrician would need a rich panel dataset for which there is not only an instrument but 
individuals’ consumption patterns are tracked over time.   
26
 In optimization we used the trust-region or the quasi-Newton algorithm (for cross-checking) with numerical 
gradient and BHHH-type approximation of the Hessian. The convergence criteria for function change, maximum of 
the gradient, and the lower bound on the size of a step were set to 
1210 , since we found that the levels and 
convergence criteria typically used in statistical packages (STATA, NLOGIT) terminated optimization prematurely, 
effectively making the results very sensitive to starting points. We believe this to be a result of a relatively flat LL 
function of the G-MNL model near its maximum and encourage other researchers who discovered problems with 
the G-MNL model convergence to try this approach. 
27
 The variable was normalized so that its mean in the sample was 0 and its standard deviation 1. This allows us to 
investigate relative differences between experience between respondents without encountering numerical 
problems associated with very high values entering the scale parameter.   
28
 While there is no clear theoretical reasons for doing so, consider the implications of adding experience related 
covariates to the right hand side of the random utility model.  First, note that the econometrician cannot 
separately identify both effects on preferences and scale simultaneously. We do not report the results here 
although they are available upon request, but we re-estimated the model including experience related covariates 
on mean willingness to pay for various policies. They are insignificant in all cases but two policy options (SQ and 
FEE).  Finally, likelihood ratio tests show that adding experience related covariates to means does not improve the 
fit of the models in any significant way. Taken together, this is evidence that the theoretical model foundations in 
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section two provide the structure to control for experience in a G-MNL model at least as well as adding experience 











































Ackerberg, D. A., 2003. Advertising, learning, and consumer choice in experience good markets: an 
empirical examination. International Economic Review, 44(3):1007-1040. 
Adamowicz, W. L., 1994. Habit Formation and Variety Seeking in a Discrete Choice Model of Recreation 
Demand. Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 19(1):19-31. 
Araña, J. E., León, C. J., and Quevedo, J. L., 2006. The effect of medical experience on the economic 
evaluation of health policies. A discrete choice experiment. Social Science and Medicine, 
63(2):512-524. 
Bateman, I. J., Burgess, D., Hutchinson, W. G., and Matthews, D. I., 2008. Learning design contingent 
valuation (LDCV): NOAA guidelines, preference learning and coherent arbitrariness. Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management, 55(2):127-141. 
Bateman, I. J., Carson, R. T., Day, B., Hanemann, M. W., Hanley, N., Hett, T., Jones-Lee, M., Loomes, G., 
Mourato, S., Özdemiroġlu, E., Pearce, D. W., Sudgen, R., and Swanson, J., 2004. Economic 
Valuation with Stated Preference Techniques: A Manual. Edward Elgar, Northampton, MA. 
Boyle, K. J., Welsh, M. P., and Bishop, R. C., 1993. The Role of Question Order and Respondent 
Experience in Contingent-Valuation Studies. Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management, 25(1):S80-S99. 
Breffle, W. S., and Morey, E. R., 2000. Investigating Preference Heterogeneity In A Repeated Discrete-
Choice Recreation Demand Model Of Atlantic Salmon Fishing. Marine Resource Economics, 
15(1):1-20. 
Brown, T. C., Kingsley, D., Peterson, G. L., Flores, N. E., Clarke, A., and Birjulin, A., 2008. Reliability of 
individual valuations of public and private goods: Choice consistency, response time, and 
preference refinement. Journal of Public Economics, 92(7):1595-1606. 
Experience and Preferences for Public Goods 
31 
 
Cameron, T. A., and Englin, J., 1997. Respondent Experience and Contingent Valuation of Environmental 
Goods. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 33(3):296-313. 
Carson, R., and Louviere, J., 2011. A Common Nomenclature for Stated Preference Elicitation 
Approaches. Environmental and Resource Economics, 49(4):539-559. 
Carson, R. T., and Czajkowski, M., 2014. The Discrete Choice Experiment Approach to Environmental 
Contingent Valuation. In: Handbook of choice modelling, S. Hess and A. Daly, eds., Edward Elgar, 
Northampton, MA. 
Carson, R. T., Hanemann, W. M., and Wegge, T. C., 2009. A Nested Logit Model of Recreational Fishing 
Demand in Alaska. Marine Resource Economics, 24(2):101-129. 
Christie, M., Hanley, N., and Hynes, S., 2007. Valuing enhancements to forest recreation using choice 
experiment and contingent behaviour methods. Journal of Forest Economics, 13(2–3):75-102. 
Corrigan, J., Kling, C., and Zhao, J., 2008. Willingness to Pay and the Cost of Commitment: An Empirical 
Specification and Test. Environmental and Resource Economics, 40(2):285-298. 
Crawford, G. S., and Shum, M., 2005. Uncertainty and Learning in Pharmaceutical Demand. 
Econometrica, 73(4):1137-1173. 
Czajkowski, M., Giergiczny, M., and Greene, W. H., 2014. Learning and fatigue effects revisited. 
Investigating the effects of accounting for unobservable preference and scale heterogeneity. 
Land Economics, 90(2):323-350. 
DeGroot, M. H., 1970. Optimal Statistical Decisions. John Wiley and Sons, Hoboken, NJ. 
DeShazo, J. R., and Fermo, G., 2002. Designing Choice Sets for Stated Preference Methods: The Effects of 
Complexity on Choice Consistency. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 
44(1):123-143. 
Erdem, T., and Keane, M. P., 1996. Decision-Making Under Uncertainty: Capturing Dynamic Brand 
Choice Processes in Turbulent Consumer Goods Markets. Marketing Science, 15(1):1-20. 
Experience and Preferences for Public Goods 
32 
 
Ferrini, S., and Scarpa, R., 2007. Designs with a priori information for nonmarket valuation with choice 
experiments: A Monte Carlo study. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 
53(3):342-363. 
Fiebig, D. G., Keane, M. P., Louviere, J., and Wasi, N., 2010. The Generalized Multinomial Logit Model: 
Accounting for Scale and Coefficient Heterogeneity. Marketing Science, 29(3):393-421. 
Fosgerau, M., 2006. Investigating the distribution of the value of travel time savings. Transportation 
Research Part B: Methodological, 40(8):688-707. 
Fryer, R., and Jackson, M. O., 2008. A Categorical Model of Cognition and Biased Decision Making. The 
B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 8(1). 
Gabaix, X., Laibson, D., Moloche, G., and Weinberg, S., 2006. Costly Information Acquisition: 
Experimental Analysis of a Boundedly Rational Model. The American Economic Review, 
96(4):1043-1068. 
Goeree, M. S., 2008. Limited Information and Advertising in the U.S. Personal Computer Industry. 
Econometrica, 76(5):1017-1074. 
Hanemann, W. M., 1984. Welfare Evaluations in Contingent Valuation Experiments with Discrete 
Responses. American Journal of of Agricultural Economics, 66(3):332-341. 
Hanley, N., Kriström, B., and Shogren, J. F., 2009. Coherent Arbitrariness: On Value Uncertainty for 
Environmental Goods. Land Economics, 85(1):41-50. 
Hanley, N., Wright, R. E., and Koop, G., 2002. Modelling Recreation Demand Using Choice Experiments: 
Climbing in Scotland. Environmental and Resource Economics, 22(3):449-466. 
Hess, S., and Rose, J. M., 2012. Can scale and coefficient heterogeneity be separated in random 
coefficients models? Transportation, 39(6):1225-1239. 
Hess, S., and Train, K., 2011. Recovery of inter- and intra-personal heterogeneity using mixed logit 
models. Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, 45(7):973-990. 
Experience and Preferences for Public Goods 
33 
 
Hinkley, D. V., 1969. On the ratio of two correlated normal random variables. Biometrika, 56(3):635-639. 
Hu, W., Adamowicz, W. L., and Veeman, M. M., 2006. Labeling Context and Reference Point Effects in 
Models of Food Attribute Demand. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 88(4):1034-
1049. 
Hynes, S., Tinch, D., and Hanley, N., 2013. Valuing improvements to coastal waters using choice 
experiments: An application to revisions of the EU Bathing Waters Directive. Marine Policy, 
40(0):137-144. 
Israel, M., 2005. Services as Experience Goods: An Empirical Examination of Consumer Learning in 
Automobile Insurance. The American Economic Review, 95(5):1444-1463. 
Krinsky, I., and Robb, A. L., 1986. On approximating the statistical properties of elasticities. The Review 
of Economics and Statistics, 68(4):715-719. 
Lancaster, K., 1966. A New Approach to Consumer Theory. Journal of Political Economy, 74(2):132-157. 
List, J. A., 2001. Do Explicit Warnings Eliminate the Hypothetical Bias in Elicitation Procedures? Evidence 
from Field Auctions for Sportscards. The American Economic Review, 91(5):1498-1507. 
List, J. A., and Shogren, J. F., 1998. Calibration of the difference between actual and hypothetical 
valuations in a field experiment. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 37(2):193-205. 
Lusk, J. L., Fields, D., and Prevatt, W., 2008. An Incentive Compatible Conjoint Ranking Mechanism. 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 90(2):487-498. 
Manski, C. F., 1977. The structure of random utility models. Theory and Decision, 8(3):229-254. 
McFadden, D., 1974. Conditional Logit Analysis of Qualititative Choice Behaviour. In: Frontiers in 
Econometrics, P. Zarembka, ed., Academic Press, New York, NY, 105-142. 
McFadden, D., 1976. The Revealed Preferences of a Government Bureaucracy: Empirical Evidence. The 
Bell Journal of Economics, 7(1):55-72. 
Experience and Preferences for Public Goods 
34 
 
Meyer, R., Erdem, T., Feinberg, F., Gilboa, I., Hutchinson, W., Krishna, A., Lippman, S., Mela, C., Pazgal, 
A., Prelec, D., and Joelx1nm, S. n., 1997. Dynamic Influences on Individual Choice Behavior. 
Marketing Letters, 8(3):349-360. 
Meyer, R. J., 1982. A Descriptive Model of Consumer Information Search Behavior. Marketing Science, 
1(1):93-121. 
Meyer, R. J., 2008. Formal Choice Models of Informal Choices: What Choice Modeling Research Can, and 
Can't, Learn from Behavioral Theory. In: Review of Marketing Research, N. K. Malhotra, ed., 
Emerald Group, 3-32. 
Monroe, K. B., 1976. The Influence of Price Differences and Brand Familiarity on Brand Preferences. 
Journal of Consumer Research, 3(1):42-49. 
Nelson, P., 1970. Information and Consumer Behavior. Journal of Political Economy, 78(2):311-329. 
Nelson, P., 1974. Advertising as Information. Journal of Political Economy, 82(4):729-754. 
Norwood, F. B., and Lusk, J. L., 2011. A calibrated auction-conjoint valuation method: Valuing pork and 
eggs produced under differing animal welfare conditions. Journal of Environmental Economics 
and Management, 62(1):80-94. 
Osborne, M., 2011. Consumer learning, switching costs, and heterogeneity: A structural examination. 
Quantitative Marketing and Economics, 9(1):25-70. 
Plott, C. R., 1996. Rational Individual Behavior in Markets and Social Choice Processes: the Discovered 
Preference Hypothesis. In: The Rational Foundations of Economic Behaviour, K. Arrow, E. 
Colombatto, M. Perlaman, and C. Schmidt, eds., McMillian, London, 225-250. 
Rabin, M., and Schrag, J. L., 1999. First Impressions Matter: A Model of Confirmatory Bias. The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 114(1):37-82. 
Revelt, D., and Train, K., 1998. Mixed Logit with Repeated Choices: Households' Choices of Appliance 
Efficiency Level. Review of Economics and Statistics, 80(4):647-657. 
Experience and Preferences for Public Goods 
35 
 
Ruud, P. A., 1996. Approximation and Simulation of the Multinomial Probit Model: An Analysis of 
Covariance Matrix Estimation. working paper, Department of Economics, University of 
California, Berkeley. 
Scarpa, R., Ferrini, S., and Willis, K., 2005. Performance of Error Component Models for Status-Quo 
Effects in Choice Experiments. In: Applications of Simulation Methods in Environmental and 
Resource Economics, R. Scarpa and A. Alberini, eds., Springer Netherlands, 247-273. 
Scarpa, R., Thiene, M., and Train, K., 2008. Utility in Willingness to Pay Space: A Tool to Address 
Confounding Random Scale Effects in Destination Choice to the Alps. American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, 90(4):994-1010. 
Stigler, G. J., and Becker, G. S., 1977. De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum. The American Economic Review, 
67(2):76-90. 
Train, K. E., and Weeks, M., 2005. Discrete Choice Models in Preference Space and Willingness-to-pay 
Space. In: Applications of Simulation Methods in Environmental and Resource Economics, R. 
Scarpa and A. Alberini, eds., Springer, Dordrecht, 1-16. 
Whitehead, J. C., Blomquist, G. C., Hoban, T. J., and Clifford, W. B., 1995. Assessing the Validity and 
Reliability of Contingent Values: A Comparison of On-Site Users, Off-Site Users, and Non-users. 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 29(2):238-251. 
Zhao, J., and Kling, C. L., 2004. Willingness to Pay, Compensating Variation, and the Cost of Commitment. 
Economic Inquiry, 42(3):503-517. 
 
  
Experience and Preferences for Public Goods 
36 
 
Figure 1. Updating of Beliefs of  kij .   
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Figure 2. Example choice card from coastal water quality survey 
 
 Beach A Beach B Beach C 
Benthic Health and 
population. 
Small increase 
More fish, mammals and 
birds. Limited potential to 
notice the change in species 
numbers. 
Large increase 
More fish, mammals and 
birds and an increased 
potential of seeing these 
species. 
No Improvement 
Health Risk  
(of stomach upsets and ear 
infections) 
Very Little Risk 
– excellent water quality 
5% Risk 
– good water quality 
10% Risk 
– no improvement 
Debris Management 
Prevention 
– more filtration of storm 
water, more regular 
cleaning of filters and better 
policing of fly tipping. 
Collection and 
Prevention 
– debris collected from 
beaches more regularly in 
addition to filtration and 
policing. 
No Improvement 
Additional cost of 
travelling to each beach. 
£3 £9 £0 
Please tick the ONE option 
you prefer. □ □ □ 
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Figure 3. Scale dynamics associated with changes in respondent’s experience indicator – coastal 
water quality study 
Cost parameter random Cost parameter non-random 
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 Model characteristics 
Log-likelihood 
(constants only)
 -4691.6270 -4691.6270 -4691.6270 -4691.6270 
Log-likelihood
 -2684.9963 -2677.2128 -2928.4668 -2927.2602 
McFadden’s 
pseudo R
2 0.4277 0.4294 0.3758 0.37607 
AIC/n
 1.2508 1.2482 1.3581 1.3585 
n (observations)
 4366 4366 4366 4366 
k (parameters)
 45 47 36 38 
Note: *, **, and *** for 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
 
 Table 2. Implicit prices for the water quality study  
 
Model without experience 
related covariates 
Model with experience 
related covariates 
Model without experience 
related covariates 
Model with experience related 
covariates 





















-4.3 – -1.19 
-2.84*** 
(0.8109) 
-4.47 –  -1.24 
-13.31*** 
(1.7184) 
-16.54 – -9.86 
-14.63*** 
(1.8605) 




0.49 – 1.52 
1.06*** 
(0.2676) 
0.55 – 1.61 
2.86*** 
(0.4316) 
1.99 – 3.71 
2.83*** 
(0.4211) 




0.15 – 1.54 
0.78** 
(0.3677) 
0.09 – 1.56 
4.75*** 
(0.7959) 
3.16 – 6.29 
4.51*** 
(0.6671) 




0.03 – 1.34 
0.64* 
(0.3559) 
-0.03 – 1.37 
3.4*** 
(0.4803) 
2.47 – 4.36 
3.33*** 
(0.4954) 




0.09 – 1.73 
0.92** 
(0.4509) 
0.07 – 1.82 
5.26*** 
(0.5804) 
4.13 – 6.43 
5.27*** 
(0.6082) 




0.54 – 1.91 
1.24*** 
(0.3471) 
0.58 – 1.94 
4.21*** 
(0.4799) 
3.28 – 5.15 
4.28*** 
(0.4845) 




1.18 – 2.23 
1.68*** 
(0.2649) 
1.15 – 2.19 
4.61*** 
(0.4308) 
3.79 – 5.49 
4.73*** 
(0.4372) 
3.9 – 5.61 
Note: *, **, and *** for 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
 
 
